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A popular argument about economic policy under uncertainty states
that decentralisation o®ers the possibility to learn from local or regional
policy experiments. We argue that such learning processes are not triv-
ial and do not occur frictionlessly: Voters have an inherent tendency to
retain a given stock of policy-related knowledge which was costly to ac-
cumulate, so that yardstick competition is improbable to function well
particularly for complex issues if representatives' actions are tightly con-
trolled by the electorate. Decentralisation provides improved learning
processes compared to unitary systems, but the results we can expect
are far from the ideal mechanisms of producing and utilising knowledge
often described in the literature.
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11 Introduction
In one of his most often-cited papers, Hayek (1968) argues that competition
on the marketplace serves as a \discovery procedure" for new, previously un-
known problem-solving routines. This argument, which is probably more or
less undisputed with regard to the market for private goods { see, for instance,
Kerber and Saam (2001) and the literature cited there { it has recently also
been submitted with regard to public goods: Competition between jurisdic-
tions is supposed to provide incentives both to conduct experiments with new
policy routines and to learn from experiments conducted in other jurisdictions.
This basic argument has, for example, been made by Salmon (1987), Vihanto
(1992) as well as Vanberg and Kerber (1994). In his extensive survey of the
economics of ¯scal federalism, Oates (1999) states that this is still a relatively
little researched problem.
What is common in these contributions is the (not always explicit) pre-
sumption of a motivation of individuals to learn, i.e., individuals are assumed
to have some motivation to gather information on institutional evolution or
on the evolution of economic policy in other jurisdictions and update their
knowledge accordingly. In the contribution by Vanberg and Kerber (1994),
for instance, this motivation is explained by referring to the private gains that
can be accrued from an e±ciency-enhancing institutional change. This is cer-
tainly very plausible when we are interested in individuals considering their
\exit"-option: If an individual considers herself mobile and has the option
of leaving jurisdiction A for jurisdiction B, and if she can gather information
about B at very low cost, then she obviously has an incentive to inform herself
about the real disposable income that she can earn in B.
This incentive disappears, however, when the option of mobility does not
exist and the only remaining option is \voice". In this case and from the
perspective of one citizen-voter among many, a change of policy is a pure,
Samuelsonian public good. If there is not a su±ciently high probability for
a representative citizen-voter to cast the decisive vote and if there are no
external rewards for a change of mind, then the individual has no obvious
incentive to incur costs to update her given, individual stock of economic
policy-related knowledge. She is rationally ignorant in a Downsian sense and
has, behind a veil of insigni¯cance, no incentive to invest resources into holding
the scienti¯cally most accurate point of view. This problem, however, seems
to be widely neglected in most of the available literature on decentralised
2economic policy.
If doubt is cast on the presumption that decentralised policy-making fosters
learning about policies, then this is done by considering the e®ect of free-riding
on information externalities. In an early approach, Rose-Ackerman (1980) has
shown that if governments can free-ride and learn from the policy experiments
of other jurisdictions, an underprovision of policy innovation in a decentralised
system results. However, Strumpf (2002) shows in more elaborate model that
policymakers have an increased propensity to experiment with new policies
in a decentralised setting if the jurisdictions are su±ciently heterogeneous
or if there are multiple policies available to experiment with. These papers
have in common that they focus on the supply side of policy experiments and
examine the incentives of incumbent policymakers in the presence of free-riding
opportunities.
In contrast, this paper intends to focus on the demand side of the pro-
cess of public good provision and therefore on the problem introduced above,
namely that a change of policy is a pure public good from the perspective of a
single voter. It will be shown that if incumbents are su±ciently restrained by
the median voter's policy preferences, important implications for the theoreti-
cal concept of decentralised economic policy-making as a discovery procedure
arise. Under realistic assumptions regarding individual incentives to gather
policy-related knowledge, learning from decentralised policy may not occur at
all, or, which is a result that is new to the literature, occur only in the wrong
(the relatively e±cient) jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it is argued that even under
such unfavourable conditions, decentralised policy still o®ers more scope for
the growth of knowledge than centralised policy.
To be able to focus on collective learning processes involving voters and
citizens, we assume a tightly controlled government throughout the paper.
The policies preferred by the majority of voters are executed frictionlessly
and there are no control problems to be solved. The argument will proceed
as follows: In the following section, the dissipation of policy-related theories
within a population will be modelled as a frequency-dependent process leading
to a stable equilibrium with a clear-cut majority theory. Section 3 introduces
a hypothetical, yet very general starting point for factor migration as well
as a distinction between loyal and perfectly mobile individuals. Section 4
discusses the incentives following from factor migration to critically examine
given policy routines and to experiment with new routines. Finally, Section 5
3o®ers some conclusions.
2 Individual uncertainty and the emergence of com-
mon beliefs
2.1 The dissemination of policy-related conjectures
The point of departure of the argument presented here is fundamentally dif-
ferent from that of approaches to ¯scal competition which involve omniscient
maximisers of welfare, rents or something alike and ask whether such a max-
imising e®ort by a number of decentralised social planners leads to a result
that would be considered optimal by an omniscient, centralised social planner.
Instead of following this lead, the notion of model uncertainty is used here:
individuals are theoretically uncertain in the sense that they do not know the
true model describing the actual properties of the economy within which they
are acting and making decisions.
Because the quality of economic policy is a public good and because we
assume that there is a large number of citizens, so that the individual prob-
ability of having the decisive vote is approximately zero, individuals do not
feel a need to invest into acquiring \rational expectations" regarding economic
policy, i.e. to utilise all available information in order to gain the most precise
theoretical and empirical knowledge about their economy that can be gained
at a given point in time. Individuals might be expected to build rational ex-
pectations if the necessary information was available costlessly and if it could
be learned e®ortlessly. But both requirements are not met here.
Following Hirschman (1989), however, it is assumed that individuals do feel
an intrinsic need to have some point of view on issues of economic policy { but,
given the public good problem, they do not feel a need to take the scienti¯cally
most up to date point of view. On the contrary, it is assumed that, once
individuals have learned a set of conjectures about di®erent economic policy
measures, they will attempt to retain them. To explain this tendency, assume
that at a time t = 0, a representative individual is completely uncertain and
has no a priori knowledge at all to fortify an opinion on economic policy. Given
her assumed intrinsic need for such an explanation, she will assume some set of
conjectures ­n 2 f­1;:::;­Ng that is supplied to her in the public discourse.
The supply side of the theory market is not explicitly modelled here. Following
Lord Keynes' famous quote that \Practical men, who believe themselves to be
4quite exempt from any intellectual in°uences, are usually the slaves of some
defunct economist" (Keynes 1936, chapter 24), one may simply assume that
every ­ has been introduced by economists into the public discourse.
As a preliminary to explaining the choice of an ­n, we assume for simplicity
that citizens are homogenous with regard to their maximand. They all wish to
maximise the same objective of economic policy, such as the level of disposable
income, employment, output growth rates or something alike. Since we focus
on the general learning process about economic policy measures and not on
some speci¯c, well-de¯ned policy problem, we do not need to concern ourselves
with the details of the maximisation problem here and can simply assume that
there is a common maximisation problem which concerns economic policy-
makers and citizens.
In this case, a plausible criterion for choosing one ­n among a possibly
large number N > 0 of available sets is the number of individuals who are
already convinced that ­n gives an accurate description of the true working
properties of the economy. If one is completely uncertain about the relative
accuracy of the N > 0 available theories, then the number of individuals who
already hold an ­n may be interpreted as a signal for its usefulness relative
to the other sets. It also may be the case that the uncertain citizen decides
upon choosing an ­n following personal communication with other, already
decided individuals. In this case, the probability that the uncertain individual
communicates with an individual advocating ­n will usually rise with the
fraction of already decided individuals who adhere to that set of conjectures.
Thus, it should be possible to model the individual selection of a set of con-
jectures about economic policy as a frequency-dependent process:1 A relatively
large number of individuals who already hold an ­n reassures an uncertain
individual that ­n is not an obscure, but a reasonable choice. One tool among
others to model such processes of frequency-dependent self-organisation is the
generalised Polya process, as proposed by Arthur et al. (1985) and further
1To some degree, there is obviously a similarity to Kuran (1987) here, in the sense that
individuals decide on taking a certain position according to the number of other individuals
who already hold that position. The important di®erence, however, is that in our model
there is no place for preference falsi¯cation: There is no di®erence between what individuals
privately believe in and what they publicly advocate. Nevertheless, the result, for which
Kuran coined the term \collective conservativism", will be quite similar.
5discussed in Arthur (1988). The essence of this process is shown in (1),
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which simply states that the expected value of the fraction 0 · wn
t+1 · 1 of
individuals in the population of already decided individuals who adhere to an
­n at a time t+1, given its fraction at a time t, depends primarily on just that
wn
t and on an arbitrary, upward-sloping function qn
t (wn
t ). Time in this model
is equal to the number of individuals who have decided themselves, i.e., it is
assumed that at any point in time exactly one individual decides which theory
to choose. The parameter m stands for the number of individuals who were
already decided at t = 0 and henceforth, we will simply assume m = N, with
the underlying assumption that every ­ is backed by exactly one individual
at t = 0. The condition for an equilibrium is easily inferred from (1): There is




which is the case if and only if qn
t (wn
t ) ¡ wn
t = 0.2
2.2 Choice and equilibria on a theory market with heteroge-
neous individuals
The piece that is still missing in our depiction of the market for theories on
economic policy is a set of assumptions on the shape of the function qn
t (wn
t ),
assigning a probability for the next uncertain individual to choose ­n to the
current market share of this theory, wn
t . If wn
t were the only in°uence in
the individual choice of a theory, the matter would be rather simple: The
¯rst individual at t = 0 would choose randomly one theory to become the
most-frequented theory ­¤ and unconstrained herding behaviour would lead
all following individuals to choose exactly the same ­¤. The process would
be locked in on a path towards a stable equilibrium with w(­¤) = 1 immedi-
ately after the ¯rst individual has made her random decision. Obviously, the
resulting complete consensus among individuals regarding their beliefs about
the proper economic policy contradicts even casual empirical evidence.
As an alternative, consider the situation when individuals are heteroge-
neous regarding their tendency to follow the majority. Let ® denote the indi-
vidual tendency to be conformist, with an ® · 0 signifying a strictly conformist
2For technical proofs regarding the existence and the (in-)stability of equilibria of a gen-
eralised Polya process, the reader is referred to the original work of W. Brian Arthur, Yuri
M. Ermoliev and Yuri M. Kaniovski.
6individual who does always and uncompromisingly choose the majority opinion
and an ® ¸ 1 signi¯ying a strictly nonconformist individual who always and
uncompromisingly refuses to take the majority opinion. Values of ® 2 (0;1)
re°ect di®erent degrees of conformism, with the actual choice depending on
w. For example, an individual with a relatively high ® just below unity is a
relatively non-conformist individual by nature, but a very high wn
t may still
convince her to join the majority.
Let ­¤
t denote the most popular theory at any given time,
­¤
t = arg max
­2f­1;:::;­Ng
wt(­): (2)
If there is no unique ­¤
t, but a set of equally popular theories, then ­¤
t is
chosen randomly from this set, with equal probabilities of choice attached to
each equally popular theory. Then we can assume individuals to value the





(1 ¡ ®) ¢ w(­) if ­ = ­¤
t
® ¢ w(­) if ­ 6= ­¤
t
(3)
and to simply choose that ­v that maximises their individual v(­). Again,
if there is no unique ­v but a set of theories that yield equal values, the
individual is assumed to choose randomly with equal probabilities from the
theories in this set.
With these assumptions made, the theory market is determined to ef-
fectively collapse from an arbitrarily high number N of available theories to
N = 2 after the ¯rst su±ciently nonconformist individual has made her choice.
To illustrate this point, suppose that the ¯rst individual to decide randomly
chooses a theory which subsequently becomes ­¤. If the next individual to de-
cide is su±ciently conformist, he will have ­¤ = ­v, pick the majority theory
and all other ­ 6= ­¤ remain equally valued. As soon as a su±ciently non-
conformist individual appears, who rejects the majority theory, he will choose
among those equally valued minority theories. But when one minority the-
ory, let it be denoted by ­m, is picked by a nonconformist individual, it will
become the preferred choice for all other, later deciding nonconformists. This
follows from (3), simply because w(­m) > w(­)8­ 6= ­¤;­m. Therefore, all
individuals who make a nonconformist decision at later stages of the process
will also choose ­m, while all individuals making a conformist decision will
choose the majority theory ­¤. The market shares of all other theories will
7tend towards zero with more and more individuals deciding between ­¤ and
­m.
In other words, being a non-conformist is not the same as being intellectual
hermit. On the contrary, a non-conformist is an individual who has a tendency
to oppose the majority, but not an individual who seeks to distinguish himself
by holding a deliberately obscure point of view. Even people who have a strong
enough nonconformist tendency to pick the minority theory have a preference
to be in a larger minority group, rather than a smaller minority group.
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and the ® for which an individual is just indi®erent between conformism and






¹ ® = w(­¤): (4)
The convergence in time of ¹ ® towards w(­¤) follows simply from the fact
that, once they are determined, only the majority theory and the preferred
minority theory are chosen, so that the added market shares of these theories
tend towards one. That does not mean that the other N ¡ 2 theories that
have existed on the theory market at t = 0 disappear altogether, but they
are marginalised and cease to have a noticeable impact on public discourse.
Knowing this, and knowing that the probability that an ­ 6= ­¤;­m is chosen
at this stage of the process is zero, the theory market is now restricted to
­¤ and ­m and w¤
t + wm
t = 1 is assumed to hold in the long run. From (4)
and assuming that an individual shuns the majority only if he clearly values
being a nonconformist higher than being a conformist, we can derive a simple
decision rule for uncertain individuals:
If ® · ¹ ®: choose ­¤ (Be a conformist)
If ® > ¹ ®: choose ­m (Be a nonconformist).
Therefore, the individual decision to adopt either the minority theory or
a preferred minority theory is based upon a parameter indicating a natural
propensity to make a conformist choice, ®, and the actual share that the
majority theory has in the population at any given point in time. To ¯nally
write down the q-function of the Polya-process discussed here, suppose that
8values of ® (i.e., degrees of conformism) are normally distributed over the
population with mean ¹ = 0:5 and an arbitrary standard deviation ¾. Given
the simple decision rule, we can then state that as soon as ­¤ and ­m are


















t) = 1 ¡ q¤
t(w¤
t): (6)
This leads to a characteristic sigmoidal graph for the two q-functions. Given
that there is a positive probability that an individual has an ® < 0 or an
® > 1, it follows that q¤
t(0) > 0, q¤
t(1) < 1, qm
t (0) > 0 and ¯nally qm
t (1) < 1.
The numerical values depend on ¾; a rise of ¾, would re°ect a growing number
of extreme conformists and nonconformists in the population. Such a change
in the composition of the population is not modelled in this paper, however:
¾ is assumed to be constant.
The relationship between the actual fraction w¤
t and the probability q¤
t of
the next individual also choosing ­¤ is depicted graphically in Figure 1. There
Figure 1: Equilibria on the theory market
are two stable equilibria for w¤ on this theory market, one at w¤
1 and one at
w¤
3. In both cases, the probability of the next individual choosing ­¤ is higher
9than the actual fraction w¤




lower for an interval where w¤
t > w¤
1;3. The attracting intervals are delimited
by the unstable equilibrium at w¤
2 = ¹ = 0:5. For any w¤
t < w¤
2, the process
will converge towards w¤
1 and for any w¤
t > w¤
2 it will converge towards w¤
3.
Since ­¤ has been de¯ned the majority theory at the outset, we can expect
its market share to converge towards w¤
3 without further interventions into
the process; the market share of the preferred minority theory ­m will then
converge towards wm = 1 ¡ w¤
3 if the process runs long enough to make the
N ¡ 2 other theories that competed on the market at the outset negligible.
3 Interjurisdictional labour and capital markets
3.1 Loyal and perfectly mobile individuals
Suppose that every individual i can be characterised by additively separable
preferences for both income and policy,
Ui(x;y) = yi + u(x) (7)
where u(x) is a positive utility that can be gained from a policy vector x and
that follows not from the outcome of a policy, but from the fact that the policy
vector is in concurrence with the theory ­i held by the individual. Let u(x) be
a step function with u(x) = ¹ u if the individual lives in a jurisdiction where ­i
determines policy and u(x) = 0 if not. Suppose further that the individual can
invest some ¯xed amount c of her income into searching for other jurisdictions
where a higher monetary income can be earned. However, if the jurisdictions
are heterogeneous with regard to their majority theories, the utility ¹ u would
be lost with a relocation. Assuming that i has an in¯nite time horizon and
some a priori belief regarding the distribution of incomes that can be earned in
other jurisdictions, at time t = ¿ she has an incentive to invest into gathering







¡ y ¡ ¹ u
¤
> c (8)
where ± > 1 is a discount factor, E(yF) is the expected value of income-earning
opportunities to be discovered in foreign jurisdictions and the assumption is
made that with given policies, all jurisdictions are in their respective steady
states with constant per-capita incomes. It is evident from (8) that for levels of
10utility ¹ u ¸ ^ ¹ u where individuals abstain from investing resources into gathering
information about foreign jurisdictions. Let the individuals for whom this is
the case be called loyal individuals. These individuals gain su±cient utility
from the policy conducted in their own jurisdiction to have no interest in
pondering the idea of relocating. Given the veil of insigni¯cance, they have
also no incentive to search for information in other jurisdictions that might
help to improve domestic politics. Loyal individuals are believers in splendid
isolation and do not gather information about foreign jurisdictions.
A second group of individuals are those with ¹ u < ^ ¹ u. They will invest into
gathering information about income earning opportunities in other jurisdic-
tions and they will migrate whenever they ¯nd a jurisdiction where the income
to be earned is su±ciently high. Thus, individuals who adhere to a minority
opinion can be expected to relocate whenever they ¯nd a foreign jurisdiction
o®ering a yF > y because for them, u(x) = 0. Finally, we assume that there
always exists a fraction of individuals with u(x) = 0 who are nevertheless im-
mobile { for example because they are socially tied to loyal individuals. This
group of individuals is characterised by a general interest to implement the
most e±cient set of policies available and is at the same time not bound to
the majority theory that prevails in their home jurisdiction.
3.2 Signals produced by decentralised policy
To investigate the signals produced by factor migration, we introduce probably
the simplest equilibrium conditions available in the literature on decentralised
¯scal policy. We assume that individuals supply homogeneous labor and own
homogeneous capital. They allocate their factors between two regions, A and
B, with the private sectors in both regions being characterised by standard,
neoclassical production functions. Adding to this, we assume that the vector
x = (¸;µ;G) comprises the policy conducted by the public sector with µ de-
noting a head tax, G denoting the quantity of a public good and ¸ denoting
the technology used to provide the public good. Presuming a perfectly con-
trolled government which frictionlessly enforces the majority's preferred policy
in order to suppress control problems, the entire tax revenue is used to provide
productive public goods and no rents are accrued by individuals in the public
sector. Public policy enters the private sector production function through a
function ½(x) with ½ > 08x. The e®ect of ½(x) is exactly the same as that of a
Hicks-neutral, factor-augmenting public input. Thus, the complete production
11function for each of the two jurisdictions m 2 A;B is
Y = ½(xh) ¢ F(Lj;Kj): (9)
Individuals are assumed to be uncertain regarding the function ½(x), and un-
certainty here implies not only parameter uncertainty, but also uncertainty
regarding the functional form of ½ { in other words, individuals act under
model uncertainty and are compelled to act upon fallible hypotheses about
the e®ects of policy changes on the aggregate output and on the marginal





@µ < 0, they do not know the exact functional form and can therefore not
simply determine the optimal size of the public sector in a marginal calculus.
Similarly, they know that a higher ¸ generates higher incomes than a lower
¸, but gathering information about superior technologies of supplying public
goods is, as already mentioned, costly.
Since we assume a perfectly controlled government and exclude rent-seeking
activities, it is evident that the entire tax revenue is used to provide the public
good G. The e®ective level of G, however, is assumed to also depend upon the
technology of public good provision, which is represented by the technology
parameter ¸ > 0, so that
G = ¸µL: (10)
In essence, the choice of policy can then be reduced to a choice of a tax rate
µ and of a technology ¸, with the level of public goods being fully determined
by these parameters. In our context, the term \technology" is supposed to
encompass a wide range of real-world phenomena: not only physical means of
production, but also the composition of a portfolio of di®erent types of public
goods. For instance, a relatively low value for ¸ could signify an excessive
emphasis on redistibutive activities compared to e±ciency-enhancing public
capital, whereas a relatively high value for ¸ signi¯es the opposite. This rather
imprecise account of possible in°uences on ¸ mirrors the problem of model
uncertainty that the individuals in the model face.3
Let labour be paid according to its marginal product and, looking at small
regions, let capital be paid the uniform world interest rate r¤ on the stock of
3Since the policy-space is not one-dimensional here, involving the choice of ¸ and µ, this
would traditionally contradict the stability of a median voter equilibrium and therefore the
assumption of a tightly controlled government frictionlessly following the median preferences.
Note, however, that stability here e®ectively comes from the theory market, where majority







kj ¢ Kj = ½(xj)F(Lj;Kj) ¡ lj ¡ µj = r¤ ¢ Kj: (12)
It is important to note that this does not imply that capital owners are fully
informed about the e®ects of policy in other jurisdictions. One reason may be
that, when deciding how to invest their capital, they observe only overall rates
of return in other jurisdictions and cannot disentangle how large the e®ect of
½(x) on this rate of return is. Another, and quite realistic reason, may be that
the vast majority of capital owners delegates the actual spatial allocation of
capital to a very small group of individuals specialised in this ¯eld and who
do not have a large enough impact on public discourse to a®ect equilibrium
choice on the theory market. As far as labour is concerned, we assume no
mobility at all at the initial stage (e.g., due to laws preventing migration) and
introduce mobility between regions with a relatively e±cient and a relatively
ine±cient policy subsequently.
Suppose for simplicity,and without loss of generality, that there are two
jurisdictions. B is the relatively e±cient region, i.e., the same amount of public
goods is ¯nanced in B with a lower tax rate, or a higher amount of public goods
is, due to a more advanced technology, ¯nanced with the same tax rate in B,
compared to A. At the initial stage, before labour mobility is introduced,
we thus have higher net incomes from labour in the low-tax jurisdiction B,
lB > lA. This is the ¯rst type of signal produced by decentralised economic
policy, namely a price signal, which sends two messages: (i) given the current
policies, a positive number of units of labour could be utilised more e±ciently
in B than in A and (ii) the policies in A and B lead to di®erent incomes from
supplying labour. This type of signal will henceforth be called a di®erential
signal. If we also introduce labour mobility, then this will obviously lead to
a change of lA and lB, as labour and capital migrate out of A into B. An
equilibrium on the interregional labour and capital markets is reached when
both conditions lA = lB and kA = kB = r¤ hold simultaneously.
The sign of the impact of migration on lA and lB is not determined in this
model, and it is probably not fully determined in reality. An unambiguously
negative sign for the derivative of l with regard to L would only result in
the special case of a linear-homogeneous production function. However, while
the assumption of such a production is frequently made in theory in order to





















and there may exist intervals for L where the positive ¯rst term overcompen-
sates a bracketed term that is negative on aggregate. A migration of productive
factors from the relatively ine±cient region A to the relatively e±cient region
B then leads to a rise of lA via the direct e®ect of out-migration on marginal
productivity, but it also leads to less capital being used in A and to a decline of
½(x) via a loss of tax revenue. Similarly, an in°ow of additional units of labour
to B would then lead to a decline of marginal labour productivity, but that
would be overcompensated by the positive e®ects generated by the additional
productive public input ¯nanced with an enlarged tax base. It is therefore not
ex ante clear whether the net e®ect of migration on the net incomes in A and
B will be positive or negative. This ambiguity of the e®ects on labour income
leads to four di®erent scenarios, which are summarised in Table 1.
Scenario I II III IV
@lA
@LA
> 0 > 0 < 0 < 0
@lB
@LB
> 0 < 0 > 0 < 0
Table 1: Possible reactions of
wages to factor migration.
While the di®erential signal results from given prices, we observe here changing
prices of labour in A and B resulting from a regional shifting of resources. Such
signals associated with price changes will thus be called shift signals.
Note that a reliable equilibriating tendency is asscociated only with sce-
nario IV. In scenario I, there is a clear disequilibriating tendency resulting
from factor migration, and in the other two scenarios the existence of an equi-
librium depends on the relative velocity of the income e®ects of migration. If
the marginal e®ect of migration on marginal productivity and on the tax base
in B are consistently smaller than that in A, then there will be a tendency
towards an equilibrium, associated with higher (III) or lower (II) incomes in
both A and B. However, given the fact that there is a group of immobile indi-
viduals in our model, factor migration can come to a rest even with persisting
income di®erentials.
144 Learning from another jurisdiction's policies
4.1 Collective learning on the theory market
Picking up the thread of Section 2.2 , some statements regarding the stability
of an equilibrium on the theory market can be made. Let stability s be de¯ned
as the absolute number of individuals who simultaneously need to change their
minds in order to transform the status quo majority theory ­¤ into a minority
theory. In this case, we have







With a rising ¹, the population becomes on average more non-conformist. As
a result, the distance w¤
3 ¡ w¤
2 in Figure 1 is reduced, so that the attracting
region of w¤
3 becomes smaller while the attracting region of w¤
1, where ­¤ is
transformed into an equilibrium minority theory, is enlarged. For su±ciently
large values of ¹, the equilibrium w¤
3 disappears, which leads to an s(¹;t) = 0.
In this case, the social networks that support ­¤ are not strong enough to
stabilise their majority theory against strong nonconformism in the popula-
tion. Even if none of the already decided individuals changes their minds,
the tendency of newly deciding individuals to shun ­¤ implies that w¤
3 is not
sustainable.
The positive impact of time on the stability of an equilibrium follows from
the technical assumption that at any point in time t exactly one individual de-
cides which theory she wants to pick. As a result, the frequencies are stable in
equilibrium, but the absolute number s of individuals that need to change their
minds to move the theory market to another equilibrium rises with t. This
may appear to be an unrealistic feature of the model on ¯rst sight, but it can
also be argued that is helps to approximate the fact that long-conveyed, tra-
ditional modes of thinking about economic policy are more di±cult to change
than theories that have only recently been introduced and that are not as
deeply rooted.
It is one of the delightful properties of the generalised Polya process that
the q-function is allowed to change over time, so that changes of ¹ can be
accounted for within the model. This allows for experience to have an impact
on the equilibirum. At the outset, before experience was considered, ¹ = 0:5
was assumed, i.e., individuals are assumed to be symmetrically distributed
along the lines of conformism and nonconformism. But it appears to be a
15plausible assumption that ¹ changes when, based upon experience, individuals
have reason to believe that ­¤ is faulty.
If a policy based upon the majority theory produces disappointing results,
we should expect that for individuals who still have to decide themselves, the
propensity to be a conformist is reduced. The more implausible the theory
appears in the light of evidence, the higher would the internal costs { e.g.,
cognitive dissonance { be that have to be born when such a theory is held.
But this necessitates high external bene¯ts { a large and in°uential network
of similarly thinking individuals { to make the relatively implausible theory
nevertheless the preferred choice. The more contradictory the evidence is, the
higher w(­¤) has to be in order to make a conformist choice probable. In other
words, ¹ rises when the majority theory grows dubious. Once the transition





2, we can assume the distribution of ® to normalise again with ¹ = 0:5.
A change of collective opinion thus simply follows from a temporary rise of
nonconformism, which enters the model as a rise of ¹ for a transitory period.
The actual learning process can then be expected to set in amongst the
remaining supporters of the now dethroned ­¤
1, who have just experienced
their set of conjectures to be gravely inept and who saw the social network
supporting their conjectures collapse to a small number of staunch believers.
In this situation, they are unlikely to give up their entire set of conjectures {
they are staunch believers, after all { but it is obvious that the vast majority
of individuals has lost con¯dence, so that some revision of the falsi¯ed set of
conjectures is necessary to be able to regain popularity and in°uence. The
supporters of the now popular ­¤
2 on the other hand have no reason to revise
their theories. Having gained popularity and in°uence and having seen the
rival ­¤
1 fail, their con¯dence is likely to be bolstered and reasons for scepticism
are scarce. Thus, while ­¤
2 is stabilised, ­¤
1 is likely to be revised. The question
is, however, under which conditions the two signals identi¯ed in Section 3
trigger e±cient learning processes.
4.2 Learning from di®erential signals
What seems particularly appealing about learning from di®erential signals is
that individuals can learn from the policies conducted in neighbouring juris-
dictions without the occurrence of any potentially distorting spatial factor
movements. This is what, among others, Besley and Case (1995) have em-
16pirically analysed under the term \yardstick competition". On ¯rst sight, the
evidence is encouraging as far as the usefulness of yardstick competition as
a learning mechanism is concerned: \Voters are able to appraise incumbents'
relative performance. From the media or other sources, voters can gain ac-
cess to information about what other incumbents are doing, which serves as
a benchmark for their own jurisdiction" (Besley and Case 1995: 30). Besley
and Case do indeed show that voters tend to deny re-election to incumbents
who raise taxes while their colleagues in neighbouring jurisdictions do not,
while they tend to accept tax raises when neighbouring governments also raise
taxes.4
The problem is, however, that while yardstick competition functions for
the tax rate, it fails for other issues of economic policy: for regionally di®ering
income levels and unemployment rates, Besley and Case ¯nd no signi¯cant
in°uence on the individuals' voting decisions. This is a somewhat puzzling
result: if voters learn from the comparison of regionally di®ering tax policies,
and a lone tax raise is deciphered as a sign for ine±ciency, then why does the
same mechanism not work for other ¯elds of policy? A possible explanation
would be that a rise of unemployment in one jurisdiction alone can be the
result of an asymmetric shock that is beyond the control of the incumbent,
so that punishing him would be irrational. The same, however, may be true
for tax rates, whose rise may simply be the result of a declining tax base
following the same type of shock. There is no fundamental di®erence between
the two variables in this respect, and it may be more reasonable to look at
the theory market for reasons of di®ering learning processes. The discussion
in the preceding subsection has shown that once the theory market within one
jurisdiction is out of equilibrium due to rising nonconformism, some collective
learning initiated by the losers of this transition can be expected. But the
underlying problem is if and under which conditions decentralised policy can
be expected to disturb the peace of local theory markets.
The evidence from Besley and Case cited in the above subsection is clearly
to be categorised as learning from di®erential signals. Yardstick competition
implies that only the fact that policies and results in one jurisdiction are
di®erent from those in another jurisdiction is used to learn about the rela-
4The presumption that yardstick competition plays a role in determining tax rates is also
supported by evidence for tax mimicking in other countries than the United States, as for
instance Revelli (2001, 2002) shows for the United Kingdom, Heyndels and Vuchelen (1997)
show for Belgium and Feld and Reulier (2003) for Switzerland.
17tive usefulness of economic policies { information °ows across borders, while
productive factors not necessarily do so. In our model, these streams of in-
formation about the relative e±ciency of di®erent policies meet a population
that is mostly characterised by a rather limited propensity to care for such
information. Considering themselves to be immobile, loyal individuals have
principally no interest at all to invest into gathering information from other
jurisdictions: being reluctant to migrate, they have no private bene¯ts to gain
from monitoring policy in other jurisdictions. And being part of a social net-
work that stabilises their given majority conjectures ­¤, they are most likely
also reluctant to critically compare ­¤ to the theories that underlie policies in
other jurisdictions.
By assumption, there is, however, always also a share of illoyal, yet immo-
bile individuals in every jurisdiction. These are individuals who do not feel
attached to the jurisdiction they live in as such, who oppose the given ­¤, but
who for some reason are not able or willing to migrate to another jurisdic-
tion. This opposition, if it manages to organise in parties or interest groups,
may serve as a channel to di®use information about the policies in other juris-
dictions within the own population, in order to weaken the popular support
for ­¤. The aim is to raise the level of nonconformism, ¹, possibly above
the critical mark where the stable equilibrium at w¤
3 in Figure 1 disappears.
Thus, internal heterogeneity of jurisdictions can be seen as an important pre-
requisite to initiate collective learning processes. In the Tiebout world, which
consists of jurisdictions with internally homogeneous populations, this inlet for
information from outside is missing. If there were internally completely ho-
mogeneous populations in the model presented here, di®erential signals would
most probably be blinded out in order to stabilise a given consensus theory.
Nevertheless, even in a heterogeneous community learning from di®erential
signals involves barriers that prevent the collective learning processes from be-
ing perfect mimicking mechanisms capable of ¯nding the most e±cient policy
and implementing it wherever this would be reasonable. With social networks
that are working to stabilise their respective conjectures, it is unlikely that
all the di®erential signals from outside that are available and contradict the
majority theory do indeed lead to a destabilisation of the equilibrium on the
theory market. If the signal that lB > lA is received in A, the underlying
di®erences of ­¤
A and ­¤
B still have to be brought to public attention, which
is usually scarce. Moreover, it is often possible to \explain" such a di®eren-
18tial signal and at the same time maintain the relatively ine±cient ­¤
A if one
accepts convenient auxiliary hypotheses, which may for example hint at prin-
cipal di®erences between jurisdictions A and B, so that they are perceived as
uncomparable.
Furthermore, it may be the case that some issues are easier to bring to
public attention than other issues. Some issues, such as tax policy, may be
more salient in the public discourse because observing and comparing tax
rates is a matter of relatively low complexity while, for example, comparing
technologies of public good production or expenditure structures in budgets
is a matter that is much more costly to communicate and, more importantly,
costly to learn about. To sum up, learning from di®erential signals alone in
a decentralised setting is a highly imperfect mechanism of collective learning
about the relative e±ciency of policies. It is, however, easy to see that it
should still be superior to a completely centralised framework. There, the
di®erential signal does not even exist. There is only one laboratory where
policy experiments can be conducted. But such an experiment is much less
likely to happen in a centralised setting, because instability on the theory
market is less likely to be induced without signals from outside. With every
step of centralisation, policy experiments occur less often in time and in a
fewer number of jurisdictions.
4.3 Learning from shift signals
For price signals following from a shift of productive factors from the relatively
ine±cient to the relatively e±cient region, generally the same statement holds
as for the di®erential signals: they are unreliable if one expects them to in-
duce e±cient learning processes. Table 1 shows that, if one does not enforce
restrictive assumptions, the sign of the e®ect of migration out of the rela-
tively ine±cient region on net wages is not fully determined. A larger tax
base allowing to ¯nance more productive infrastructure may overcompensate
the direct e®ect on marginal labour productivity, or it may not. In the rel-
atively ine±cient region, net incomes may rise as a result of out-migration if
the public goods e®ect does not overcompensate the direct e®ect on marginal
productivity.
If there are barriers to migration at the outset and if these are lifted, mi-
gration out of the relatively ine±cient and into the relatively e±cient region
may therefore lead to perverse incentives for collective learning. If scenarios
19III or IV occur, the remaining individuals in the relatively ine±cient region
experience a raise of their incomes after labour mobility is implemented. This
signal, on its own, is certainly not the right incentive to revise the relatively
ine±cient ­¤
A. A satis¯cer, who bene¯ts from his income rising above his aspi-
ration level, there is little reason to increase his scepticism and nonconformism
in such a scenario.
In scenarios II and IV , perverse incentives are also present for individuals
in the relatively e±cient region B, as they experience a decline of their net
incomes as a result of incoming migration from A. In this case, the trend of net
incomes as a result of migration is unsettling for the wrong individuals, namely
those who hold the relatively more e±cient conjectures. Only in scenario I are
the e®ects of migration on net incomes suitable to set incentives for e±cient
collective learning processes.
These problems may be reduced if individuals learn from both type of
signals considered here. To also reckon that the level of incomes is higher
in B than it is in A is certainly an improvement compared to an exclusive
reliance on the shift signals. Especially in scenarios that imply a further
divergence of income levels, the additional information would enforce justi¯ed
scepticism in A. If there is no divergence, though, then a convergence of
income levels can easily serve as an argument to defend ­¤
A: if the income
level in B is decreasing, then this can be easily interpreted as an indicator
that, for instance, circumstances have changed and ­¤
B is out of time.
Thus, there is even more information necessary to ensure that individuals
have the correct incentives. They have to know the di®erential signal, the shift
signal and they have to reckon that the shift signal follows from migration
and that migration out of A is a sign of relative ine±ciency of ­¤
A. This
may be trivial for an economist { but for an individual who defends his set
of conjectures behind a veil of insigni¯cance and within a stabilising social
network, a willingness to face the facts cannot be simply presupposed.
Nevertheless, from a knowledge-producing perspective, decentralisation is
still preferred to centralisation. Decentralisation delivers a systematic ten-
dency to destabilise equilibria on the theory market. Even if this does not
necessarily occur in the correct (the ine±cient) jurisdiction, a change of ­¤
B
would also produce new knowledge about the e±cacy of economic policies. A
unitary system is missing this inherent instability that comes with the signals
discussed here and is thus bound to produce less knowledge.
205 Conclusion and outlook
It has been argued that under decentralised economic policy-making, more
knowledge about the relative e±cacy of di®erent theories underlying policies
is produced compared to unitary systems. The problem is only that incentives
to revise a given set of conjectures and thus to experiment with new policies
are not necessarily to be found in the relatively ine±cient region. While more
knowledge is produced in decentralised systems, it cannot be ensured that
there is a frictionless di®usion process where the relatively e±cient policy is
adopted by all jurisdictions.
Somewhat surprisingly, this result has also an encouraging facet, because
diversity of policies is likely to be sustained. There is no ex post harmonisation
towards one e±cient policy, but rather an ongoing process where distorted
equilibria on the theory market lead to a continuing revision of theories, which
in turn leads to experiments with new policies. In this process, an abrupt
disappearance of theories in unlikely, and a syncretic change in which small,
seemingly successful elements of policies in other jurisdictions are incorporated
into one's own theories are more probable.
As far as future research is concerned, the discussion hints at the fact
that decentralisation as a knowledge-generating process may be made more
e±cient if it comes with supporting institutions that set incentives for the
electorate to gather more information than it is assumed in the present paper.
For example, it may be worthwhile to augment the model with non-economic
incentives to invest into collecting information about the relative e±cacy of
di®erent economic policies and the relative usefulness of theories underlying
these policies. Empirical research suggests that such incentives may be associ-
ated with a feeling of civic duty that is present when decisions on public goods
and taxes are made within a direct democratic framework (Benz and Stutzer,
2004). It was the purpose of the present paper, however, to show that with
strictly rational and self-interested voters, perverse incentives to learn from
decentralised policy may exist under reasonable assumptions.
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